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THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION. By Herbert
Hovenkamp. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. 2005.
Pp. vi, 368. $39.95.
INTRODUCTION
Herbert Hovenkamp' is one of the preeminent antitrust scholars of his
generation and the current custodian of the highly influential Areeda-Tumer
Antitrust Law treatise.2 The treatise (now commonly referred to as the
"Areeda-Hovenkamp" treatise) is in its second edition, spans fourteen vol-
umes, and enjoys unparalleled prestige. It has been cited in over forty
Supreme Court decisions and in hundreds of lower court decisions. Justice
Breyer once remarked that advocates would prefer to have "two paragraphs
of Areeda's treatise on their side than three Courts of Appeals or four Su-
preme Court Justices."3
As custodian of the treatise, Hovenkamp speaks with oracle-like author-
ity on antitrust matters. Recently, a company that settled an antitrust lawsuit
for a disappointingly low sum explained to its shareholders that a new draft
article by Hovenkamp posted for public comment on the Social Science Re-
search Network ("SSRN") had diminished the value of its claims by
undermining one of its key legal theories.4 Such is Hovenkamp's authority
in antitrust circles.
Given Hovenkamp's influence and intellect, the publication of The Anti-
trust Enterprise is a major event, particularly since he sets out, according to
the book's jacket, to provide "the first authoritative and compact exposition
of antitrust law since Robert Bork's classic The Antitrust Paradox was pub-
lished more than thirty years ago." Nevertheless, one could quibble with the
jacket's claim. Richard Posner substantially updated his own authoritative
and compact exposition of antitrust law in 2001. 5 In a 2003 book review,
Hovenkamp called Posner's second edition a "marvelous and important
* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I thank Eleanor Fox
and Hanno Kaiser for many helpful comments.
I. Ben V. and Dorothy Willie Professor of Law and History, University of Iowa College of
Law.
2. Hovenkamp is the current lead reviser of what began as PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD F.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW (Ist ed. 1978).
3. Justice Stephen Breyer, In Memoriam: Phillip E. Areeda, 109 HARv. L. REV. 889 (1996).
4. See Info. Res., Inc. Litigation Contingent Payment Rights Trust Annual Report (Form
10-K), at 6 (Mar. 31, 2006).
5. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001) (1976).
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book.' '6 So, before beginning a review of Hovenkamp's new work, it seems
necessary to address the question of why we need another such treatment
four years later.
The answer is that Hovenkamp's goal is very different from that of
Posner and Bork. Posner and Bork wrote what Hovenkamp calls "polemi-
cal works" against the prevailing antitrust regime (p. 37). In the 1970s the
prevailing regime was highly interventionist, suspicious of all manner of
horizontal and vertical restraints and mergers, and intent on protecting
small business from larger rivals, regardless of the cost to consumers.
Bork and Posner's "polemical" works attacked the entire edifice of anti-
trust reasoning that had prevailed since the second half of the New Deal.
By 2001, Posner had seen much of his revolutionary vision come to frui-
tion, but his second edition retained its attacks on the Warren Court's
antitrust policies just in case anyone was tempted to turn back the clock.
Hovenkamp has no such revolutionary ambition. As custodian of the
Areeda-Turner treatise and hence the doctrinal center, he takes care to
avoid associating too closely with any particular antitrust "school." While
he describes his own position as primarily "new Harvard" (p. 37), one is
hard-pressed to locate the core tenets of this "new Harvard" school. It cer-
tainly does not resemble the Structure-Conduct-Performance Harvard
school of the 1950s and '60s, which viewed antitrust problems in formal-
ized structuralist terms. As Hovenkamp acknowledges, the Harvard school
(and the Areeda treatise) took a sharp turn westward, toward Chicago, af-
ter Donald Turner's conversion experience in the late 1970s. 7 Although
"new Harvard" borrows from the institutional design concerns of the tradi-
tional Harvard school-administrability is one of Hovenkamp's key
concerns-this "new Harvard" school could just as easily be called "Chi-
cago lite." It accepts the essential theoretic insights of the Chicago School
but acts cautiously in applying them to real cases because of skepticism
over the predictive power of theoretic models in litigation. Hovenkamp
readily admits that the main differences between the new Harvard and
Chicago schools "lie in details" (p. 38).
By the same token, this "new Harvard" school embraces some of the
insights of the post-Chicago school-which tends to justify greater anti-
trust intervention following game-theoretic predictions of market
failures-but then is hesitant to apply those theoretic insights without
strong proof of their predictive power in real cases. As Hovenkamp notes,
"new Harvard" is "the position most followed by the federal courts today"
(p. 37). In other words, then, the antitrust enterprise that Hovenkamp ad-
6. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARV. L. REV. 917, 944
(2003) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 5).
7. P. 37. The Chicago school of antitrust law generally began in the 1950s with Aaron Di-
rector and other economists and law professors associated with the University of Chicago. The
Chicago school sought to debunk the interventionist assumptions of various legal doctrines, such as
structuralist assumptions about industry performance in merger cases and the purported threats to
competition from tying and predatory pricing. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 925-28 (1979).
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vocates is the antitrust jurisprudence of the judicial mainstream, a gener-
ally incremental and cautious enterprise.
To be sure, Hovenkamp is not merely an apologist for the status quo.
He musters criticisms of several mainstream antitrust positions-for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court's Kodak,' Illinois Brick,9 Maricopaj' Brooke
Group," California Dental, 2 and Dr Miles"3 decisions, and the Depart-
ment of Justice's ("DOJ") post-appeal position on remedies in
Microsoft4 -and offers numerous suggestions for improving antitrust law
and practice. But the general tenor of the book is conservative, in both
senses of the word. Hovenkamp defends the essential character of the anti-
trust enterprise as it exists today and advocates a restrained approach to
antitrust intervention in commercial markets.
Overall, Hovenkamp defends the antitrust status quo in accessible and
wonderfully jargon-free prose. The book succeeds in offering profound
insights for antitrust specialists while remaining accessible to lay readers.
Where necessary, Hovenkamp rounds off the rough edges of an antitrust
enterprise that is otherwise about where it ought to be. His proposals for
reform, summarized at the conclusion of the book, are mostly ideas that
mainstream voices have proposed, and some may see the light of day
when the Antitrust Modernization Commission concludes its work in
2007. '5
The Antitrust Enterprise is organized into three parts. Part I-"Limits
and Possibilities"-presents an overview of consumer welfare economics,
the limitations of antitrust as a regulatory regime, and the procedural appa-
ratus of antitrust enforcement. Part II-"Traditional Antitrust Rules"-
examines the state of contemporary antitrust law in its three primary areas
of coverage: collaborative restraints of trade," unilateral exclusionary
conduct, 7 and mergers. 8 Part III-"Regulation, Innovation, and Connec-
tivity"-addresses various "hot" issues in antitrust enforcement, such as
8. Pp. 98-102 (discussing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451
(1992)).
9. Pp. 74-76 (discussing Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977)).
10. Pp. 142-43 (discussing Arizona v. Maricopa Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332 (1982)).
H1. Pp. 169-70 (discussing Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209 (1993)).
12. Pp. 147-48 (discussing Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999)).
13. P. 186 (discussing Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)).
14. Pp. 298-304 (discussing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001)).
15. The Antitrust Modernization Commission was created by Congress in 2002 and charged
with studying the antitrust laws and producing a report to Congress and the President. Antitrust
Modernization Commission, About the Commission, http://www.amc.gov/aboutcommission.htm
(last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
16. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
17. Id.§2.
18. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
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the obligation to do business with competitors, intellectual property and
antitrust convergence, and the role of competition policy in network indus-
tries.
Hovenkamp's work is an important and welcome book by an undisputed
master of the trade. But perhaps the lingering value of the book is that it
thoroughly captures the spirit of this particular moment in U.S. antitrust law
both for the present generation and for historians to come. To exaggerate
only slightly, Hovenkamp is the modem antitrust enterprise. And, like Ho-
venkamp himself, the antitrust enterprise has become, in a word, modest-
existentially, procedurally, and substantively. In the following sections, this
Review examines this modesty from existential, procedural, and substantive
perspectives. The Review then offers some insights as to where the antitrust
enterprise may go next whenever it sheds its current modesty and reclaims a
more aggressive posture.
I. EXISTENTIAL MODESTY
For someone whose life's work is antitrust law,' 9 Hovenkamp has low
expectations about what antitrust should seek to accomplish. He repeatedly
admonishes that antitrust is "an economic, not a moral, enterprise," dismiss-
ing the specter that antitrust's heavy artillery should be turned on ordinary
business torts (pp. 10, 54). Further, Hovenkamp does not believe that anti-
trust is well suited to perform a wealth-redistribution function, such as
allocating the gains of trade between producers, consumers, labor, and other
interests (p. 45). Hovenkamp understands allocative efficiency as antitrust's
sole normative aspiration.
So far, no surprises. Very few mainstream scholars view antitrust's goals
as moral or assign it a redistributionist goal.20 But Hovenkamp goes further
than simply limiting antitrust's normative goal. In at least three additional
ways, he seeks to reign in antitrust's ambitions.
First, he assigns antitrust a back seat to other branches of regulatory pol-
icy. In his view, antitrust is merely a "residual" regulator, "promot[ing]
competition to the extent that market choices have not been preempted by
some alternative regulatory enterprise" (p. 13). Thus, antitrust principles
never should be invoked to challenge legislative overextension of intellec-
tual property rights or regulatory folly (p. 255). Antitrusters may wring their
hands in frustration at congressional largesse with copyright holders, as with
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 2' but theirs is not to rectify
(p. 250). Antitrust corrects market failures, not governmental failures.
19. In The Antitrust Enterprise, Hovenkamp describes the Antitrust Law treatise as his "life's
work." P. vii.
20. This was not always the case. It is not difficult to locate early antitrust decisions ex-
pressly locating a moral content to antitrust. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 201 F. 697, 716
(S.D. Ohio 1912) (concluding that there is a moral basis to the Sherman Act because "dealings
between man and man must be on terms ofjustice").
21. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108,
203, 301-304 (2000)). The act has been nicknamed the Mickey Mouse Protection Act.
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Second, Hovenkamp advocates restraint when applying antitrust law to
correct even admitted market failures. Hovenkamp describes antitrust law as
a "second order" regulatory regime that is "largely reactive" to severe mar-
ket distortions (pp. 14-15). In what could be the topic sentence for Bork's
The Antitrust Paradox, Hovenkamp admonishes, "At all times we must re-
member that if we believe that markets generally work well when left alone,
then intervention is justified only in the relatively few cases where the judi-
ciary can fix the problem more reliably, more cheaply, or more quickly than
the market can fix itself' (p. 124). Antitrust interventions should be few and
far between.
Finally, Hovenkamp takes a narrow view of the kind of harm with which
antitrust law should be concerned. This comes out particularly in Hovenk-
amp's sharp criticism of the Supreme Court's Kodak2 decision, where the
Supreme Court allowed independent service organizations' claims that Ko-
dak had monopolized aftermarkets for photocopier service by refusing to
sell replacement parts for Kodak copiers (pp. 98-102). The standard Chi-
cago school criticism of Kodak, which Hovenkamp embraces, is that Kodak
could not have had a monopoly in the service market since it faced vigorous
23
competition in the primary market for copiers. In Kodak, however, the
Court expressed concern that Kodak could find it profitable to act anticom-
petitively as to its installed base of customers who became "locked in" to
Kodak parts and service.
One response to the majority view in Kodak-probably a correct one-
is that these sort of anticompetitive effects due to market imperfections are
theoretically plausible but extremely unlikely and, therefore, do not justify a
rule of antitrust intervention in aftermarkets where the primary market is
competitive. 24 Hovenkamp, however, goes further and postulates that anti-
trust should not interfere even if aftermarket distortions occur due to
customer lock-in. Hovenkamp worries that allowing power in an aftermarket
to become "market power" within the meaning of antitrust law would dan-
gerously expand the antitrust domain by making "antitrust the vehicle for
fixing contracts that we might think unfair or, worse yet, for protecting peo-
ple from their own carelessly made bargains" (p. 101).
What is particularly interesting about this last observation is that an act
could cause harm to consumers through suppressing competition and yet,
per Hovenkamp, lack sufficient antitrust ingredients because it does not af-
fect a market broader than the defendant's own brand. For Hovenkamp,
harm to consumers because of suppression of competition is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for the intervention of antitrust law. A seller's own
brand can never be a market unto itself, even if the seller prevents competi-
tors from offering customers replacement parts or service for the brand and,
thereby, is able to exact monopoly rents from customers.
22. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
23. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 5, at 236-37.
24. Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 63 ANT[-
TRUST L.J. 483 (1995).
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There is nothing inevitable about this view of antitrust injury and noth-
ing conceptual to prevent antitrust from being applied to aftermarkets of a
single seller's brand.25 The reasons for taking this view are largely pruden-
tial, not conceptual. Hovenkamp argues that antitrust must be cabined
because it is too blunt an instrument, too laden with baggage (such as the
treble damages remedy), and too easily misconstrued by judges and juries to
be unleashed on competitive business behavior at large. Antitrust must as-
pire to only a modest supporting role in the broader enterprise of economic
regulation.
In one important sense, however, Hovenkamp does not display existen-
tial modesty about the antitrust enterprise. He recognizes that the legislative
history of the major antitrust statutes conflicts with the consumerist, effi-
ciency-oriented ideology that prevails today (p. 40-41). The Sherman and
Clayton Acts to some extent, and the Robinson-Patman and Cellar-Kefauver
Acts to a large extent, were motivated by protecting small business from
26larger, more efficient rivals. Hovenkamp is too intellectually honest to try
to reconstruct a consumerist account of antitrust law by pasting together
disparate snippets of legislative history, as Robert Bork has been accused of
27doing. Instead, he bluntly advocates ignoring the Brandeisian views ad-
vanced in the legislative history as outmoded, irrational, and not compelled
by the statutory language (p. 43).
Antitrust since the Chicago revolution has been in overt rebellion against
past congressional will. But it is hard to find anyone today eager to enforce
that long-expired will. The economic interpretation of the antitrust laws is so
much more consistent with contemporary values that, by silent conspiracy,
the antitrust agencies, litigants, courts, and most scholars have let the old
ideas be forgotten. It feels much like a wacky old uncle has died leaving his
entire fortune to the cat, and the probate judge and next of kin quietly agree
that he must have meant the family instead. Who will complain? So one
cheer for disregarding irrational and inconvenient congressional intent! Par-
ticularly when it gets in the way of antitrust minimalism.
25. As Benjamin Klein and John Wiley have observed, market power within the meaning of
antitrust law need not be market power in the way that economists use that term. Benjamin Klein &
John Shepherd Wiley, Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination As An Antitrust Justification for Intel-
lectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599, 624-29 (2003). Economists view market
power as the power to charge a price over marginal cost. Such power is inherent whenever there is
brand differentiation, as there was in Kodak, but allowing this to become market power of the kind
with which antitrust concerns itself would vastly expand the antitrust domain given the ubiquity of
brand differentiation. See id.
26. For a generally accurate recounting of the Cellar-Kefauver Amendment's troubling legis-
lative history, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962). Although many
scholars believe that the Robinson-Patman Act's legislative history evidences a similarly protection-
ist bent, others find efficiency concerns in the legislative history. E.g., Andrew I. Gavil, Secondary
Line Price Discrimination and the Fate of Morton Salt: To Save It, Let Go of It, 48 EMORY L.J.
1057, 1074-80 (1999).
27. For a leading criticism of Bork's view of the Sherman Act's legislative history, see
Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Effi-




A good bit of The Antitrust Enterprise focuses on procedure, although
Hovenkamp does not break "substance" and "procedure" into separate sec-
tions of the book. A staunch functionalist, Hovenkamp understands that
procedure and substance are often not discrete and separately operating re-
positories of legal norms, but interdependent and, at times, indistinguishable
categories. When Hovenkamp analyzes the "design of antitrust rules" in
the first section of the book, he considers a range of loosely procedural and
remedial issues, and continues similarly later in the book when he assesses
tools for analyzing market concentration in the merger context, and the inef-
fectiveness of the remedies in Microsoft. The "procedural" concerns that
Hovenkamp addresses generally concern adjudicatory design in private liti-
gation, merger review tools, standing, and remedies.
A. Adjudicatory Design in Private Litigation
Much of Hovenkamp's existential modesty with respect to antitrust
arises from the adjudicatory design of antitrust litigation. In particular, Ho-
venkamp lacks faith in the performance of judges, economists, and juries,
who all have a major role to play in antitrust trials. Since he is working un-
der the premise that "[t]he basic rule should be nonintervention unless the
court is confident that it has identified anti-competitive conduct and can ap-
ply an effective remedy," it is not surprising that his distrust of the relevant
institutional players translates into a relatively minimalist antitrust agenda
(p. 47).
As between judges, juries, and expert economists, Hovenkamp is most
willing to delegate responsibility to judges. Juries, in particular, he finds to
be utterly incapable of addressing complex antitrust issues. He notes, with
good reason, that "Ij]ury trials in front of intelligent but nonspecialist judges
is a truly miserable way to make economic policy" (p. 4). Hovenkamp
recognizes that juries serve two important functions in the American legal
system: "to determine whether a witness is speaking truthfully" and "to de-
fine the community's moral boundaries" (p. 48). But neither of these
functions applies much to antitrust. Antitrust cases do not typically require
juries to decide personal facts, such as whether a witness is speaking truth-
fully about factual matters (e.g., whether the light was red or green or
whether he pulled the trigger). Instead, they require judgment about eco-
nomic facts, such as whether a firm had market power and whether a
particular efficiency was realized in a particular way.29 Further, if antitrust is
not a moral endeavor, then the jury's role as moral compass is inapplicable.
28. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 85,
112-13; Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 215-24 (2004).
29. On the distinction between economic and personal facts in antitrust cases, see Daniel A.




Hovenkamp is similarly distrustful of economic experts. He disparages
the Sixth Circuit's approval of the plaintiff's expert's testimony in Conwood
Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., which resulted in a $1.05 billion judgment against
U.S. Tobacco for monopolizing the moist snuff tobacco market.3° Con-
wood's expert used a regression analysis that showed nothing more than
consistency in Conwood's growth on a state-by-state basis, without offering
any reason to believe that consistency in growth was correlated or even as-
sociated with anticompetitive conduct (pp. 87-88). Allowing such testimony
to go to a jury of laypersons produces arbitrary results, since the jurors will
merely decide based on the rhetorical skills of the experts and lawyers. Ho-
venkamp proposes to take technical aspects of antitrust analysis away from
juries by strengthening the district court's gatekeeping function under
Dauber?' and by appointing neutral experts to decide technical matters (pp.
307-08).
Hovenkamp is quite correct that juries are singularly unqualified to re-
solve complex disputes over industrial organization matters and that
economic experts sometimes take advantage of this.32 It is questionable,
however, whether the incompetence of antitrust juries and the charlatanry of
some economic experts has as profound an influence as other adjudicatory
design features do in antitrust cases. Indeed, the statistics suggest that trials
are extraordinarily rare in private antitrust cases. Of the 707 federal antitrust
cases that were terminated in 2005, 203 were terminated through voluntary
dismissal or private settlement, 492 by court dismissal on a motion to dis-
miss or summary judgment, and only 12 cases, 1.7% of all cases terminated,
reached a trial.33 Of those 12 cases, only 9 were tried to juries.
If only nine antitrust cases are being tried to federal juries every year,
one may wonder how much time it is worth spending on the defects of juries
as antitrust adjudicators. Of course, even a small number of wild jury ver-
dicts like the $1.05 billion award against U.S. Tobacco and the $1.28 billion
judgment against Tyson Fresh Meats3 4 shape the settlement calculus in the
hundreds of cases that never reach trial. But far more frequent than the trial
as adjudication mechanism is pretrial motion practice. The reality of private
30. Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 E3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002).
31. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In Kumho ire Co. v. Carmi-
chael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), the Supreme Court made clear that the Dauben gatekeeping role of the
federal courts applies to all experts, even those whose area of expertise is not the hard sciences.
32. Arthur Austin's study of the performance of jurors in five antitrust cases concluded that
the jurors "were overwhelmed, frustrated, and confused by testimony well beyond their comprehen-
sion." Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New Media and Deviancy, 73
DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 54 (1995).
33. The statistics reported here come from UNITED STATES COURTS 2005, TABLE C-4, U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS-CIVIL CASES TERMINATED, BY NATURE OF SUIT AND ACTION TAKEN, DURING
THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2005 (2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbus2005/appendices/c4.pdf. By contrast, the federal government initiates only twenty to thirty
civil antitrust lawsuits per year and roughly the same number of criminal antitrust cases.
34. Elizabeth Becker, Jury Awards Ranchers $1.28 Billion from Tyson, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,




antitrust litigation is that defendants have two shots to avoid trial-a motion
to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment-or else risk aversion forces
them to pay a substantial sum to avoid a trial, given the unpredictability of
jury results and the vast damages awards that antitrust cases can generate.35
An institutional design issue equally important to trial roles, and one
that Hovenkamp does not discuss much, is how courts should manage mo-
tion-to-dismiss and summary-judgment practice. The Supreme Court's
Matsushita36 decision encourages trial courts to play a gatekeeping role with
respect to summary judgment in complex antitrust cases, summarily dis-
missing any claims that are not economically plausible.37 The Court recently
granted certiorari to review a Second Circuit decision rejecting a defendant's
argument that courts should play a similar "economic plausibility" screening
role with respect to motions to dismiss.38 The resolution of this issue will
have important implications for the structure of antitrust adjudication.
A tighter screening function at the motion-to-dismiss stage would di-
minish the value of antitrust claims by preventing plaintiffs from getting
discovery necessary to create issues of fact at summary judgment and,
thereby, force pretrial settlement. Further, since defendants often bear
greater discovery costs than plaintiffs,3 9 just surviving a motion to dismiss
can give a plaintiff considerable settlement leverage. Given the rarity of jury
trials and the aggressiveness of the federal courts in disposing of antitrust
cases through pretrial motion practice, issues such as burdens of proof, legal
presumptions, discovery management, and whether the "plausibility" analy-
sis should occur at the motion-to-dismiss or summary-judgment stage merit
at least as much attention as the defects of the jury system and the unreli-
ability of some economic experts.
B. Merger Review
Hovenkamp's concerns with misleading empiricism extend beyond the
context of private litigation. He also criticizes the antitrust enforcement agen-
cies' overreliance on market concentration indexes in merger review (pp. 212-
14). Under the Merger Guidelines that the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") and Justice Department Antitrust Division have adopted jointly, the
agencies assess market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
35. See Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13-15
(2005).
36. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
37. See Nickolai G. Levin, The Nomos and Narrative of Matsushita, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
1627 (2005).
38. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2005); Twombly, 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir.
2005).
39. Frank H. Easterbook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1, 34 (1984) (observing
that defendants in antitrust cases often bear greater costs than plaintiffs because "[t]he defendant is




("HHI"),4' which requires summing the squares of the market shares of all
participants in the relevant product and geographic markets both before and
after the proposed merger. The agencies use both the post-merger concentra-
tion figure and the difference between the before and after figures as
significant screens in deciding whether to challenge a merger. Hovenkamp
criticizes the HHI approach for creating "an appearance of great rigor to
merger analysis" and "superficially precise 'readouts' of market concentra-
tion," when in fact the numbers on which the computations are based are
derived from "assumption, conjecture, and even speculation" (p. 213). In-
stead of relying on daunting concentration indexes, Hovenkamp would
simply ask how many significant firms are in the market, and undertake a
serious review if the proposed merger would result in the number dropping
as low as four or five (p. 214).
Hovenkamp is surely correct that the lay observer could be easily fooled
into over-crediting HHI results, given their appearance of expert rigor and
precision, but his concern that the HHI calculation distorts the process of
merger review may be overstated. As Hovenkamp notes, data reported by
the FTC and DOJ suggest that the agencies do not zealously adhere to their
own concentration zone presumptions.4' In practice, the HHI calculation is
simply one analytical tool employed during merger review, and probably
does not distort overall outcomes any more than Hovenkamp's simplified,
intuitive approach would. If the superficial rigor of the HHI fools anyone, it
is the casual lay observer, not the agencies themselves or the potentially
merging firms. Unless we are terribly concerned that the general public will
be misled by the agencies' approach to merger review, there is probably not
too much to worry about. Further, it is not clear that an approach that fo-
cuses on four or five major firms in the market improves much over the
defects in the HHI approach. The difficult tasks of defining the relevant
market, identifying which firms are participating in that market, and ascer-
taining each firm's share of the market are still necessary to that task.
C. Standing
One quasi-procedural question Hovenkamp raises that is extremely im-
portant is the standing of various classes of purchasers when the defendant
has raised prices above competitive levels. Under the current federal regime,
only "direct" purchasers-those who purchased directly from the defen-
42dant-have standing to bring a claim. Since many direct purchasers, such
as wholesalers or retailers, often do not absorb much or any economic loss
and merely "pass on" the overcharge to the ultimate consumers, the direct-
40. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.51 (rev. 1997),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf.
41. P. 213; FTC & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER CHALLENGES DATA, FISCAL YEARS
1999-2003 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/12/mdp.pdf.
42. Il. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).
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purchaser rule often results in uninjured businesses recovering large settle-
ments and injured consumers recovering nothing.43 As a result, some states
have passed "Illinois Brick repealer" statutes giving indirect-purchaser con-
sumers the right to sue under state antitrust statutes."
The upshot of this is yet more confusion and incoherence, including
complicated layers of class action certification and settlement proceedings
and vast overcompensation to purchasers as a class. Hovenkamp would cut
through the Gordian knot of purchaser standing by awarding lost profits to
any purchasers who resold the overcharged product and awarding over-
charge damages to any end user of the product (p. 307).
While superficially appealing, Hovenkamp's proposal might not sim-
plify matters much. In many cases, the resellers/end-users dichotomy may
be easier to identify in theory than in practice. For example, how would the
law treat a manufacturer that purchased a price-fixed item that was a small
component of a larger item that the manufacturer produced and then sold
downstream through a complex distribution chain? The manufacturer would
not be an "end user" with standing to claim an overcharge, and it would not
be easy for the manufacturer to prove what profits it lost as a result of the
price fix. The end user who purchased the final product from a retailer
would theoretically have standing to assert the overcharge claim, but it
would be extremely difficult to prove with reasonable certainty the impact
of the price fix in the initial component, which was passed down to the
manufacturer through an initial distribution chain, incorporated into the end
product, and passed on down to the consumer through a second distribution
chain. Whatever its faults, the direct purchaser rule has the virtue of limiting
the damages chain at the level of the purchaser who bought from the
wrongdoer. Sometimes efforts to simplify imperfect rules create greater
complexity and more serious imperfection.
D. Remedies
When it comes to remedies, Hovenkamp seeks both more and less ag-
gressive intervention. On the "less" side of the equation, Hovenkamp notes
that the treble damages remedy-which is automatic for any private party
who establishes an antitrust violation 4-lacks any justification in most
43. See generally Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois
Brick in Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1999).
44. In California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989), the Court held that the Sherman Act
does not preempt such statutes.
45. This is not to say that the current purchasers standing rules are the best that can be done.
The Antitrust Modernization Commission has heard a variety of intriguing proposals, including one
that would require consolidation of the claims of all aggrieved purchasers in a single action, dis-
gorgement by the defendant of the total monopoly overcharge and other damages caused by the
anticompetitive conduct, and some formula for allocating the recovery from the defendant between
the various classes of purchasers. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM., CIVIL REMEDIES-
INDIRECT PURCHASER DISCUSSION OUTLINE, http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetingslCivRem-IndP-
DiscOutline060504-fin I .pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2006).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
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cases (pp. 66-68). About this he is surely correct. The treble damages rem-
edy is only economically justifiable as a means of making antitrust
violations negative expected-value acts, given the probability of detection. 7
When the probability that an anticompetitive act will be discovered is near
100%, treble damages are unnecessary to supply correct incentives, can in-
crease the incentives of rent-seeking firms to bring baseless antitrust• 41
lawsuits, and can chill beneficial competitive practices. With the exception
of hard-core price-fixing cartels, most antitrust violations are easily ob-
served. Indeed, some strategic anticompetitive behavior, like predatory
pricifhg, is only likely to work if a dominant firm succeeds in signaling its• 49
predatory commitment to rivals.
Hovenkamp's proposal to limit antitrust damages to single damages in
most cases would amount to a substantial change from the status quo, but it
is by no means an off-center position. Scholars have been calling for de-
trebling antitrust damages for a long time.0 Unfortunately, the Antitrust
Modernization Commission's study of the issue appears to be headed to-
ward a recommendation that the status quo be retained,5 which will likely
doom us to treble damages for the foreseeable future.
On the "more aggressive" side of the remedies equation, Hovenkamp
sharply criticizes the final settlement in the Justice Department's case
against Microsoft, which he believes failed to track the extent of Microsoft's
wrongdoing, including Judge Jackson's holdings that were sustained on ap-
peal 2 In particular, Hovenkamp believes that the settlement did not go far
enough in promoting future competition, and merely disallowed prospective
conduct that had already entrenched Microsoft's dominant position in the
PC-compatible operating systems market.
But then what remedy would have been appropriate? Here, Hovenkamp
once again betrays a most modest ambition for antitrust law. Contrary to the
initial position of the federal government and the preferences of many aca-
demics, Microsoft competitors, consumer groups, and industry observers,
Hovenkamp would not have broken up Microsoft into separate platform and
47. See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968).
48. See Crane, supra note 35, at 60.
49. See id. at 39-43.
50. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 5, at 272.
51. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM., SUPPLEMENTAL CIVIL REMEDIES-DAMAGES
DISCUSSION OUTLINE, http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/CivRem-DamagesSupplOutline060720
circ.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2006).
52. Pp. 298-304. After the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed
some of Judge Jackson's findings, reversed others, and remanded the case to a new district court
judge for further proceedings (including on remedy), Judge Kollar-Kotelly entered a judgment that
largely resembled the post-appeal settlement reached by the United States and nine of the state
plaintiffs. The judgment required licensing of certain protocols necessary for interoperability, pro-
hibited Microsoft from retaliating against customers that used products created by Microsoft's
competitors, and required Microsoft to enable end users and original equipment manufacturers to
use middleware products created by Microsoft's competitors. New York v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F
Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2002).
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applications divisions (p. 301). Indeed, drawing on failed divestiture ap-
proaches from Standard Oil to United Shoe to AT&T, Hovenkamp turns
away from the Harvard school's structuralist bent and expresses skepticism
about structural remedies in general (pp. 301-02). 3
Here, at last, Hovenkamp departs from the cautious tone of most of The
Antitrust Enterprise, and advocates a bold remedial program in cases like
Microsoft. But, tellingly, the remedy he proposes is not an antitrust remedy
at all. Indeed, it does not involve any formal legal sanction. Rather, Hovenk-
amp would have the federal government use its vast influence as a purchaser
14of goods and services to promote competition. Here, Hovenkamp draws on
the government's effective restructuring of the aluminum industry when it
sold off its aluminum assets after World War II in a way deliberately calcu-
lated to break up Alcoa's monopoly (p. 302). Similarly, Hovenkamp says,
the federal government could break up Microsoft's monopoly by requiring
its departments and agencies to use open-source software as an alternative to
Microsoft's products (p. 302).
Those who believe that many federal agencies are already ineffective
will doubtlessly react with alarm at the prospect that, with the stroke of a
pen, Windows could be banished from the computers of 2.7 million federal
employees55 in favor of Linux. (Personally, I hope that the federal abandon-
ment of Windows would not take place on the day I am waiting in line for a
new passport.) Hovenkamp would probably respond that sometimes compe-
tition policy requires bold governmental action to redress entrenched
monopoly power. Bold governmental action, but not necessarily antitrust
action. After all, antitrust is merely a residual regulator, a blunt instrument
appropriate for only a narrow set of market failures.
And that pretty much sums up Hovenkamp's general approach to anti-
trust procedure and remedies. He is suspicious of both excessive theory and
excessive empiricism. The antitrust procedure he advocates is that of sim-
plicity and common sense--quiet, unassuming, and competent, rather than
bold, ambitious, and complex. Hovenkamp believes that industrial competi-
tion is often too complicated a matter to be well regulated through
adjudication, and that "confidence levels in antitrust cases are often unusu-
ally low" (p. 52). And, since the baseline rule is nonintervention unless there
is a high degree of certainty in both the correctness of the liability determi-
nation and the efficacy of the remedy, Hovenkamp's doubts about antitrust's
procedural effectiveness lead him to substantive modesty as well.
53. Hovenkamp once proposed a structural remedy for persistent and severe antitrust violations
by Microsoft: "A better solution [than injunctive relief] is a limited 'divestiture' decree, which in this
case takes the form of a judicially supervised auction in which Microsoft is required to give non-
exclusive licenses in all of its Windows software and the 'Windows' name to a predesignated number of
winning bidders-say, five." Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Remedies for "Private Intellectual Prop-
erty Bottlenecks", in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 1998: REGULATING COMMUNICATIONS
MARKETS 131, 148 (Claus Dieter Ehlermann & Louisa Gotling eds., 2000).
54. Bruce Abramson makes a similar proposal in BRUCE ABRAMSON, DIGITAL PHOENIX:
WHY THE INFORMATION ECONOMY COLLAPSED AND How IT WILL RISE AGAIN 190-96 (2005).




The opening paragraph of The Antitrust Enterprise tells us that the anti-
trust community has reached a correct consensus on the goals of antitrust, but
needs a better set of rules to implement those goals (p. 1). Hovenkamp follows
up throughout the book with a series of observations about the way to design
antitrust liability rules and about the defects in some of the current rules. The
overall themes are to simplify liability rule-making, jettison outdated and
overly interventionist rules, and correct misperceptions about which market
actors are likely to give rise to particular kinds of market failures.
A. Modes of Liability Rule-Making
A compact treatment of antitrust law like The Antitrust Enterprise can-
not cover every substantive question in the field, and Hovenkamp mercifully
spares us the technical detail that antitrust specialists find so useful about
the Antitrust Law treatise. Instead, he addresses the general approach that
courts should take in framing liability rules for both collaborative-conduct
and exclusionary-conduct cases.
Both areas are in some transition, perhaps confusion, today. Not too long
ago, the one thing the average lawyer probably knew about antitrust was that
all collaborative restraints of trade are lumped into one of two categories:
the per se rule, by which the conduct is absolutely condemned without con-
sidering its justifications or efficiency consequences, and the rule of reason,
by which a wide range of issues, effects, and justifications must be consid-
ered, weighed, and balanced. In recent years, this dualism has begun to fray.
First came the "quick look" cases, NCAA5 6 and California Dental,57 in which
the Supreme Court suggested that there might be some third category inter-
mediate to the per se rule and the rule of reason." More recently, the Federal
Trade Commission and the D.C. Circuit have suggested that the whole "di-
chotomous categorical approach" has given way "to a more nuanced and
case-specific inquiry.' 59 Rules are out; standards are in.
Hovenkamp wisely seeks to bring some discipline to Section 1 analysis
by stressing that it need not be as categorical as some interpretations of the
per se rule nor as open-ended as the classic Chicago Board of Trade60 for-
mulation might suggest. On the one hand, Hovenkamp criticizes an
56. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
57. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
58. See Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not a Quick Look But Not the Full
Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 496-97 (2000).
59. Polygram Holdings, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also In re Poly-
gram Holdings, Inc., No. 9298, 2003 WL 21770765 (F.T.C. July 24, 2003).
60. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (requiring analysis
of "the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable[;] [t]he history
of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, [and] the
purpose or end sought to be attained").
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approach that applies the per se rule as a binding principle of stare decisis
rather than a mode of analysis (pp. 120-21). On the other hand, he repeat-
edly admonishes that courts are not very good at open-ended balancing, and
that rule-of-reason analysis should not turn into an "anything goes" open-
ended approach (pp. 30, 108, 148). Hovenkamp seeks to make the per se
rule less rigid and the rule of reason less open-ended by suggesting a unified
and disciplined methodology to Section 1 questions that proceeds through a
series of questions, the answers to which entail shifting burdens and pre-
sumptions (p. 149).
The need for a more systematic and continuous approach to Section 1
analysis is apparent. Under the "dichotomous" system, business conduct
tended to be too quickly tossed into either a per se illegality or virtual per se
legality basket.6' Nonetheless, Hovenkamp's proposed approach may under-
value bright-line antitrust rules by requiring a more nuanced and searching
adjudicatory mode. Even if such an approach would improve adjudicatory
accuracy, it might diminish the predictability of antitrust results for busi-
nesses. Trading ex ante predictability for ex post accuracy is not necessarily
desirable, particularly in an area like antitrust, which, Hovenkamp repeat-
edly reminds us, is designed to create efficient economic incentives, not to
achieve distributive justice.
Hovenkamp is more receptive to bright-line rules when he turns to uni-
lateral exclusionary conduct (the "monopolization" offense under Section 2
of the Sherman Act). Unlike in the Section 1 context in which he advocates
an across-the-board, reticulated analytic mode, in the Section 2 context
Hovenkamp jumps straight from the highly abstract question "what is an
exclusionary act?" to specific liability rules (p. 152). The seeming inconse-
quence of the gap that Hovenkamp leaves between the theoretic definition
and the conduct-specific rules leaves one feeling that perhaps too much ink
is being spilled on the theoretic question.62 Better just to get the rules as
sharp as possible without worrying about their congruity with some meta-
physical statement of principle.
Much of Hovenkamp's attention to the substance of exclusionary con-
duct rules focuses on tweaking the existing rules governing price
competition, rules that have been the subject of much recent discussion.
Once again, Hovenkamp's suggestions are generally to adjust the status quo
incrementally. On predatory pricing, federal courts have been highly
61. Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J. 305, 305
(1987) (asserting that "as a practical matter [this] meant that [practices challenged under the rule of
reason] were declared lawful per se"); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic
Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977) ("The content of
the Rule of Reason is largely unknown; in practice, it is little more than a euphemism for
nonliability.").
62. Uncovering a generalized definition of exclusionary conduct has been the subject of
extensive debate in antitrust circles in recent years. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling,
Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 EMORY L.J. 423 (2006); Einer Elhauge, Defining Better
Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253 (2003); Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the
Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147 (2005); Thomas E. Kauper, Section Two of the Sherman Act:




influenced by the views of Hovenkamp's predecessors, Areeda and Turner,
and Hovenkamp bolsters and explains the largely noninterventionist views
they advocated (pp. 158-67). The Supreme Court's Brooke Group6 decision
receives mild criticism for underestimating a dominant firm's ability to use
predatory pricing to discipline a maverick price-cutter, but one could not
expect anything less from Hovenkamp (pp. 168-70). After all, Areeda ar-
gued the case for the losing plaintiff and Bork argued for the prevailing
defendant. However small the gap between "new Harvard" and Chicago,
Hovenkamp faithfully sides with Cambridge in any conflict.
B. Old Rules That Need to Go
At times, Hovenkamp's ideological conservatism-his belief that markets
usually operate best when left free from antitrust intervention-collides with
his juridical conservatism-his respect for the incremental, common law
process of American adjudication. When this occurs, his ideological conserva-
tism usually prevails. Thus, Hovenkamp announces a substantive reform
agenda that involves jettisoning several long-standing common law rules and
even a statute, the oft-maligned Robinson-Patman Act.
On closer inspection, though, much that Hovenkamp proposes would
cause little deviation from the status quo. One of Hovenkamp's proposals-
reversing the seventy-year-old presumption that patents confer market
power in tying cases (p. 261)-was achieved in 2006 in a Supreme Court
opinion that relied on the same recommendation from the Antitrust Law
treatise. 6' Although Congress has yet to repeal the Robinson-Patman Act,
another Supreme Court case decided after The Antitrust Enterprise was pub-
lished arguably followed Hovenkamp's alternative recommendation that the
courts read a competitive injury requirement into the statute. 66 And, yes, the
Court again relied extensively on Hovenkamp's treatise, bolstering Hovenk-
amp's status as the single most influential antitrust scholar in the United
States.
In two additional areas, Hovenkamp's proposals for changes in common
law antitrust rules enjoy considerable sympathy in the academic community
and probably on the Supreme Court, and may see action in coming years. In
the meantime, the lower courts continue to follow the older rules. First, Ho-
venkamp would do away with the essential facilities doctrine, which
imposes on firms controlling "essential facilities" a duty to provide access to
63. See Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the
Future, 75 CAL. L. REV. 959, 968 (1987); Phillip Areeda & Donald F Turner, Predatory Pricing and
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 711 (1975); Phillip
Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1976).
64. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
65. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 475 U.S. 574, 583 (2006) (citing 10 PHILLIP
AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & EINER ELHAUGE, ANTITRUST LAW 1737c (2d ed. 2004)).
66. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 860 (2006). The Court
asserted that it "would resist interpretation [of the Robinson-Patman Act] geared more to the protec-
tion of existing competitors than to the stimulation of competition." Id. at 872.
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competitors (p. 247). Although the Supreme Court seemed to cast doubt on
67the theory in 2004, more recent lower court decisions continue to suggest
its viability.6' Similarly, Hovenkamp would eliminate the rule of per se ille-
gality for minimum retail price maintenance (p. 188), although lower courts
continue to follow it in the absence of new guidance from the Supreme
Court, which may be forthcoming shortly.69 Hovenkamp and his Antitrust
Law treatise are such bellwethers of future Supreme Court developments
that last rites might as well be administered to these last two interventionist
rules.
C. Misperceptions about Market Dynamics
Bad antitrust precedent comes in two flavors: ideologically misguided,
and economically ignorant. Hovenkamp complains about "antitrust's overly
ideological history," but understands that very little of the bad ideology still
lingers (p. 11). But economic ignorance abounds. Hovenkamp hopes to cor-
rect at least a few of the most pervasive errors. Here, we encounter
Hovenkamp at his best, as the professor patiently correcting widespread
misunderstandings.
Some of the lessons that Hovenkamp seeks to impart are merely refresh-
ers from Chicago's heyday. ° But Hovenkamp also has some fresh
emphases, perspectives that are not entirely new but that he elucidates
plainly and more convincingly than others before him. In particular, in his
chapter on antitrust and distribution, Hovenkamp strongly makes the case
that courts evaluating vertical restraints are misguided to look askance at
manufacturers. Manufacturers usually have nothing to gain from anticom-
petitive vertical restraints, which would have the effect of eliminating
competition at the retail level, and, hence, increasing the manufacturer's
distribution cost. Instead, to the extent that a vertical restraint is anticom-
petitive, it is probably because a powerful retailer is coercing the
manufacturer to disadvantage the retailer's competitors (p. 183). With the
growth of powerful big-box retailers like Wal-Mart, this last insight could
have a profound impact on antitrust analysis of vertical restraints.
Hovenkamp also encourages courts to scrutinize more closely the regu-
latory activities of professional associations (p. 147). In California Dental,
which Hovenkamp criticizes, the Supreme Court upheld a dental associa-
67. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
68. See, e.g., Gregory v. Fort Bridger Rendezvous Ass'n, 448 F.3d 1195, 1204 (10th Cir.
2006); MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2004).
69. See, e.g., PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 171 F. App'x 464 (5th Cir.
2006). The Supreme Court recently stayed the mandate in PSKS pending its decision on a petition
for a writ of certiorari. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 28 (Aug. 28,
2006) (mem.).
70. For example, Hovenkamp dismantles the "leverage" fallacy that failed to understand that
a monopolist cannot profitably leverage its monopoly into a second market since monopoly pricing
in the second product would cause a loss of demand for the first product. P. 201. Chicago schoolers
made this observation frequently in the 1970s and later. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 7, at 947 n.65.
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tion's "ethical" rule prohibiting most member advertising about price and
quality.7 ' A believer in the general robustness of markets, Hovenkamp is
more willing to believe that a market failure has occurred when it is
prompted by a quasi-governmental association. In the Chicago school view,
governmental corruption is the most likely and durable source of monopoly
72
power. Although Hovenkamp does not go that far, he does remind us that
anticompetitive effects often lie in the shadow of regulatory enterprises ad-
vanced in the name of the public interest.
Still, Hovenkamp cautions that antitrust must not be used to challenge
governmental regulation directly (pp. 233-34). Recognizing governmental
manipulation as a problem is one thing; turning antitrust against governmen-
tal failure is another. Antitrust must never forget that it is a residual
regulator, a modest enterprise.
IV. BEYOND MODESTY
The hallmark of Hovenkamp's antitrust is modesty, and Hovenkamp is
the embodiment of the current antitrust epoch. With the wide consensus that
consumer welfare is antitrust's sole normative goal, the enterprise has been
almost entirely de-ideologized and depoliticized. At a recent symposium on
antitrust at (where else?) the University of Chicago, two recent chairmen of
the Federal Trade Commission-one a Bush-appointed Republican and the
other a Clinton-appointed Democrat-lauded one another for the ideological
and political neutrality that antitrust enforcement has assumed. 73 Antitrust
has become a largely technocratic field for economic experts. The public
pays it little attention, and the antitrust community has accepted the result-
ing trade-offs. Antitrust no longer lends itself to large political gestures or
radical interventions-"trust-busting" is out of fashion, as we learned from
the failure of the divestiture proposal in Microsoft.14 In return for this loss of
political grandeur and public saliency, the antitrust community contents it-
self with insulation from external political pressure and internal control over
its institutions, resources, and direction.
Whatever its virtues, it is doubtful that the current equilibrium will last.
The history of antitrust law is not one of incremental rationalization, but,
rather, one of Hegelian opposition between conflicting ideals. Sharp clashes
of competing paradigms result in the dominance of a particular school of
thought until another clash produces a new winner. Antitrust history is a
story of epochs, from the populism of the Progressive Era, to the first half of
71. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1999).
72. For example, the one place where Bork seemed to advocate more antitrust scrutiny rather
than less was in his chapter on predation through government processes. ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 347-64 (1978).
73. Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
165, 183-87 (2005); Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present, and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 212 (2005).




the New Deal governed by the guild-oriented philosophy of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, to the second half of the New Deal and Thurman
Arnold's rigorous enforcement, to the structuralist paradigm of the Harvard
school, to the Chicago school of the 1970s, and beyond.
75
If history is a reliable teacher, we are once again in an antitrust epoch
that will eventually be displaced rudely and abruptly by some new para-
digm. What new paradigm will arise to challenge the epoch of modesty?
The Antitrust Enterprise focuses on explaining, defending, and refining the
status quo, and does not consider that question. However, at least two candi-
dates come to mind.
First, behavioral law and economics is challenging the central rationality
assumption that underlies the current paradigm. Hovenkamp assumes such
rationality, noting that "[t]he entire antitrust enterprise is dedicated to the
proposition that business firms behave rationally" (p. 134). The behavioral-
ist model posits that human decision-making under uncertainty is
systematically flawed by the used of various false heuristic shortcuts. 76 The
broad implication for antitrust is that we cannot assume that market actors'
behavior will produce efficient outcomes. Behavioralism-particularly as
applied to business behavior-has many skeptics to answer. But, if
behavioralism ever catches on, the era of antitrust modesty could see its de-
mise as a much more interventionist regulatory agenda emerges.
A second and more radical challenge to the current antitrust paradigm
might occur if the antiglobalization movement ever ascends politically. The
vagueness and indeterminacy of the antitrust statutes coupled with their in-
finitely malleable legislative history provides ample room for
antiglobalization advocates to reinterpret antitrust as a limitation on interna-
tional corporate growth and a preference for locally owned and controlled
industry. Already, one can see the emergence of antitrust themes in the in-
creasingly popular anti-Wal-Mart campaign of many municipalities,
scholars, and community activists. 77 Although Wal-Mart's U.S. growth has
been mostly the product of internal expansion-which U.S. antitrust law
generally protects-a popular reinterpretation of antitrust law to address
unchecked corporate expansion and related concerns about cultural hegem-
ony, labor practices, environmental impacts, and the loss of "moms and
pops" is not far-fetched.
75. See generally RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992
(1996) (recounting over a hundred years of the history of economic competition policy, rhetoric, and
law).
76. Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 3 (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2000) ("It is now well established that people make decisions on the basis of heuristic
devices, or rules of thumb, that may work well in many cases but that also lead to systematic er-
rors.").
77. For example, former Labor Secretary Robert Reich has advocated "reinstat[ing] the first
principle of antitrust," preventing "companies [from] becoming so large [that] they distort[] the
political process," and going after Wal-Mart even though he recognizes that consumers are the "clear
beneficiaries" of Wal-Mart's business model. Robert B. Reich, Wal-Mart is Too Big,
http://www.robertreich.org/reich/20040421.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2006); see also Barry Lynn,
Breaking the Chain: The Antitrust Case Against Wal-Mart, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, July 2006, at 29.
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Of course, to displace the current antitrust paradigm, behavioralism
would need to capture the academy and antiglobalization the electorate.
There is no telling whether either of those things will happen. But it is inter-
esting to ponder where antitrust could go next. During every antitrust era,
the prevailing paradigm seemed durable and inevitable, even as the seeds of
the successor paradigm were being sown. Antitrust enforcement is highly
dependent on broader political-economic currents, and it would be naive to
imagine that the era of antitrust modesty has captured antitrust's proper role
once and for all. We do not know what will come next, but if history is a
reliable guide, at some point there will be a sharp departure from the present
paradigm.
Regardless of where the law heads next, The Antitrust Enterprise is
valuable simply on its own terms-as a compact and authoritative exposi-
tion of U.S. antitrust law. It is most interesting, however, as the archetypal
defense of this era of antitrust modesty. Only with the benefit of hindsight-
perhaps forty or fifty years from now-will scholars be able to understand
fully this epoch in context. It is a safe bet, however, that The Antitrust En-
terprise will be considered the classic work of this era.
